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Railroads Running Roughshod: The 
Preemptive Power of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act on 
Tort Claims 
Justin Hymes* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Justice Ginsburg argued that the displacement of state tort law “with 
no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the void” creates an 
outcome that “defies common sense and sound policy.” The preemptive 
power of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA) 
creates such an outcome. 
To ensure the Surface Transportation Board (STB) has exclusive 
regulatory control over railroads, the ICCTA preempts any local or state 
laws that have a regulatory impact on railroads. If a railroad’s activity 
causes harm to a plaintiff, the plaintiff will likely bring a state tort cause 
of action against the railroad. Railroads argue that these tort claims have a 
regulatory impact on their activities and are thus preempted. Plaintiffs, in 
turn, believe that such claims have only an incidental impact on railroads. 
Courts have not reached a consensus on whether state tort causes of action 
are preempted by the ICCTA. 
When plaintiffs’ tort claims are preempted, individuals are left 
without any remedy. These individuals enter a legal limbo where their 
state tort claims are preempted by the ICCTA, but where no substitute 
federal causes of action exist. Consequently, railroads are not held 
accountable for their tortious behavior, and plaintiffs are left without any 
legal recourse. The key issue for analysis, then, is how to correct this 
injustice in the face of the ICCTA’s preemptive power. 
This Comment argues that the legal limbo created by the ICCTA 
must be corrected. In the past, when a statute had this unjust effect on 
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innocent plaintiffs, Congress amended the statute and reined in the 
statute’s preemptive force. The ICCTA needs similar amending. 
Alternatively, courts should focus on notions of equity and fairness rather 
than quibbling over congressional intent. A focus on fairness aligns with 
the Supreme Court’s view of tort preemption and ensures that plaintiffs 
can seek justice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA)1 
was passed in 1995. As its name suggests, the ICCTA dissolved the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), the long-standing federal body 
that regulated surface transportation.2 Before the ICCTA was passed, an 
 
 1. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat. 803, 804 
(1995). 
 2. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat. 803, 804–05 
(1995). 
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intermingling of local, state, and federal laws regulated railroads.3 In 
passing the ICCTA, regulation of the railroad industry was weakened.4 
The ICCTA created the Surface Transportation Board (STB), which was 
to have exclusive jurisdiction over surface transportation matters.5 
Besides giving the STB exclusive regulatory power, the ICCTA also 
preempts any laws that attempt to regulate rail transportation.6 The 
language of the ICCTA leaves little doubt as to whether the ICCTA has 
preemptive power.7 In fact, 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) states that the remedies 
and laws under the ICCTA “with respect to regulation of rail 
transportation . . . preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State 
law.”8 However, the language of § 10501(b) fails to clarify which laws 
regulate rail transportation and which laws merely relate to rail 
transportation without having a regulatory effect.9 
If a state law or local ordinance, for example, required a railroad to 
construct its tracks in a certain way or to schedule its transit during specific 
times, that law would seem to have a regulatory impact on railroads, 
thereby prompting preemption. Unfortunately, whether a law impacts 
railroads in a way that rises to such a level of regulation is not always clear. 
This lack of clarity is perhaps most vexing in the context of state law tort 
claims brought by plaintiffs against railroads. 
For example, if a railroad’s activities cause noise and pollution that 
damage a neighboring property, that property owner may be inclined to 
bring a negligence or nuisance cause of action against the railroad. The 
owner may seek an injunction against the tortious behavior, or monetary 
damages for the injury suffered.10 Railroads would argue that these tort 
claims have a regulatory impact on their activities and economics, and 
thus, that such claims are preempted.11 Plaintiffs, in turn, would argue that 
bringing such claims has only an incidental impact on railroads.12 Thus, 
the ICCTA provides little clarity in the context of such claims. 
 
 3. See Paul S. Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce Commission: 
The Tortuous Path From Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure, 95 
MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (2012).  
 4. See Norfolk S. Ry., No. FD 35701, slip op. at 4, 6 n.14 (Surface Transp. Bd. Nov. 
4, 2013) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 95–96 (1995)). 
 5. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017).  
 6. See id.  
 7. See id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. See id. 
 10. See Pace v. CSX Transp., 613 F.3d 1066, 1068–70 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 1069–70. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1069. 
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Most importantly, when plaintiffs’ tort claims are preempted, these 
individuals are left without any remedy.13  Preempted plaintiffs enter a 
legal limbo where their state tort claims are preempted by the ICCTA, but 
where no substitute federal causes of action exist.14 Thus, railroads are not 
held accountable for their injurious behavior, and plaintiffs are left without 
any legal recourse.15 The key issue for analysis, then, is how to correct this 
legal limbo in the face of the ICCTA’s preemptive power. 
Part II of this Comment details the ICCTA’s history and preemption 
law generally, and examines how courts have approached ICCTA tort 
preemption in the past.16 The injustice that results from such preemption 
is highlighted.17 Part III then analyzes the legal justifications for correcting 
the legal limbo that results from ICCTA tort preemption and calls for 
Congress to amend the ICCTA, or alternatively, for courts to place more 
emphasis on notions of equity and fairness.18 Finally, Part IV offers 
concluding statements on the issues raised by the Comment.19 
II. BACKGROUND 
The emergence of the ICCTA stemmed from a widespread desire to 
deregulate surface transportation and enact a uniform set of federal 
regulations to control surface transportation sectors like railroads.20 As a 
result, the ICCTA now exclusively regulates the railroad industry through 
its governing body, the STB.21 As part of its regulatory scheme, the 
ICCTA preempts state laws that interfere with railroad activity.22 
Therefore, a discussion of general preemption law and the ICCTA’s 
preemptive force is necessary.23 The ICCTA’s preemptive power in the 
context of tort claims will also be examined, and case law both favoring 
and disfavoring tort preemption will be highlighted.24 
 
 
 13. See, e.g., Maynard v. CSX Transp., 360 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842–43 (E.D. Ky. 2004) 
(holding that plaintiffs’ tort claims against a railroad were preempted, thereby leaving the 
plaintiffs, whose land was being polluted and damaged by the railroad’s coal loading 
operation, without any legal remedy to address the tortious behavior). 
 14. See id. at 843. 
 15. See Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the 
Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 142 (2011). 
 16. See infra Part II.   
 17. See infra Part II.   
 18. See infra Part III.   
 19. See infra Part IV.   
 20. See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 1152.  
 21. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 22. See id.  
 23. See infra Sections II.B–.C.  
 24. See infra Section II.D. 
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A. The History and Function of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Termination Act 
In 1995, Congress passed the ICCTA.25 The ICCTA dissolved the 
Interstate Commerce Commission,26 a nearly 100-year-old agency that 
regulated various sectors of surface transportation, including railroads, 
trucking, water carriers, and buses.27 The ICC was born out of widespread 
government disdain for many railroad practices, and, for much of its 
existence, the ICC was a powerful force that regulated most aspects of rail 
transit.28 Often, ICC regulations were not the exclusive regulatory tools 
affecting railroads because a patchwork of local and state intrastate 
regulations also controlled or influenced railroad activity.29 
By 1970, concerns over competition in the railroad industry had 
subsided, and an ideological shift favoring the deregulation of railroads 
emerged.30 This shift away from intense federal regulation culminated in 
the termination of the ICC and the creation of the STB.31 
The ICCTA gave the STB exclusive jurisdiction and control over 
most railroad issues and other surface transportation regulatory matters.32 
Though the STB was a regulatory replacement for the ICC, the STB flexes 
a weaker regulatory muscle.33 Unlike the ICC’s broad regulatory authority, 
the ICCTA states that, “[i]n regulating the railroad industry, it is the policy 
of the federal government to minimize the need for federal regulatory 
control over the rail transportation system and to require fair and 
expeditious regulatory decisions when regulation is required.”34 The STB 
thus lacks the regulatory power of its predecessor. 
Despite its weakened regulatory power, the STB remains the 
controlling body for economic matters affecting railroads.35 Under the 
 
 25. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 101, 109 Stat. 803, 
804(1995). 
 26. Id.  
 27. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 28. See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 1169–70. Before the creation of ICC, issues like 
rate discrimination and attempts by railroads to obtain influence over state and government 
officials were common. Id. at 1169. Moreover, railroads often significantly lowered rates 
in areas where they had market power, thus increasing the likelihood of monopolies, and 
making growth for smaller railroads near impossible. Id. at 1069–70. The ICC was created 
to monitor and stop these practices, specifically by regulating rates and corruption. Id.  
 29. See id. at 1171. 
 30. See id. at 1173 (“By the mid-1970s, the political mood in Washington had shifted 
against economic regulation. Regulatory failure took much of the blame for the anemic 
state of the rail industry.”).  
 31. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106. 
 32. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b). 
 33. See 49 U.S.C. § 10101(2). 
 34. Id. (emphasis added).  
 35. See generally 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b).  
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ICC, local and state regulations intermingled with federal laws and 
overwhelmed the railroad industry with regulation.36 With the STB acting 
as the exclusive regulatory body for railroads, however, state and local 
regulations no longer have the effect of interfering with interstate 
commerce.37 The net effect is ultimately less regulation on the industry.38 
The express language of the ICCTA reflects Congress’s desire to 
weaken regulatory control by giving exclusive regulatory power to the 
STB: 
The jurisdiction of the Board over— 
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in this 
part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including car service, 
interchange, and other operating rules), practices, routes, services, and 
facilities of such carriers; and 
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or 
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks, or 
facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to be located, 
entirely in one State, is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this 
part, the remedies provided under this part with respect to regulation 
of rail transportation are exclusive and preempt the remedies provided 
under Federal or State law.39 
In addition to giving the STB exclusive regulatory power, § 10501(b) 
contains a preemption clause.40 Any law that has the effect of regulating 
rail transportation is preempted by the ICCTA because such regulatory 
power is exclusively reserved for the STB.41 The inclusion of this 
preemption clause is consistent with the congressional desire to reduce 
regulatory control by providing a uniform body of law for railroads to 
follow.42 
B. The Law of Preemption 
An examination of general preemption law in the United States is 
necessary before exploring the preemptive effect of the ICCTA. The 
preemption doctrine is based on the Supremacy Clause in the United States 
Constitution, which states that federal law “shall be the supreme law of the 
 
 36. See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 1171, 1173. 
 37. See Norfolk S. Ry., supra note 4, at 4, 6 n.14 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-311, at 
95–96 (1995)). 
 38. See Dempsey, supra note 3, at 1173. 
 39. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(emphasis added). 
 40. See id.  
 41. See id. 
 42. See id.; see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. City of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1330-
31 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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land.”43 Alternatively, the Supremacy Clause can be viewed as a “choice 
of law” provision that ensures only that federal law prevails if a state law 
conflicts with it,44 and that congressional power to preempt comes from 
Congress’s enumerated powers.45 Both interpretations likely have merit 
and are plausible justifications for preemption.46 Whatever the 
constitutional origin, Congress certainly has the power to preempt both 
state common law and state statutory law through federal legislation.47 
Through its preemptive power, Congress can “prohibit the states 
from regulating in certain areas and, where the states are allowed to 
regulate, to assert primacy in a conflict between state and federal 
regulatory schemes.”48 Accordingly, two types of preemptive power are 
generally recognized by courts: complete preemption and ordinary 
preemption.49 
Complete preemption reflects the doctrine that “in certain matters 
Congress so strongly intended an exclusive federal cause of action that 
what a plaintiff calls a state law claim is to be recharacterized as a federal 
claim.”50 If, for example, a claim is removed to federal court because the 
claim falls under federal question jurisdiction,51 that claim has been 
completely preempted. 
Complete preemption has been applied in only a limited number of 
contexts,52 and the Supreme Court has established two criteria that must 
be met for a finding of complete preemption to be proper.53 The first 
requirement is the exclusive federal regulation of the claim’s subject 
matter.54 Typically, if Congress has indicated an intent to completely 
occupy the relevant field, this requirement will be satisfied.55 The second 
requirement is the existence of an alternative federal claim that allows the 
state claim to be transformed into a federal cause of action.56 Courts are 
 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cuesta, 458 
U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (explaining that preemption “has its roots in the Supremacy Clause”). 
 44. Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: 
Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 918–19 
(2003).  
 45. See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 
2088 (2000) (declaring that “it is critically important to note [that] the Supremacy Clause 
itself does not authorize Congress to preempt state laws”). 
 46. Id.  
 47. Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 151–52. 
 48. Ausness, supra note 44, at 917. 
 49. See, e.g., Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., 533 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 52. See Fayard, 533 F.3d 42 at 45.  
 53. See id. at 46. 
 54. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 (1968). 
 55. Id.  
 56. See, e.g., Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003). 
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more inclined to completely preempt a state claim if a substitute federal 
cause of action exists for the plaintiff to subsequently pursue.57 
In contrast to complete preemption, ordinary preemption most 
commonly applies when a state claim conflicts with a federal statute.58 
Unlike complete preemption, which prompts removal to federal court due 
to federal question jurisdiction, ordinary preemption is a defense to a state 
claim and is not a ground for removal.59 Ordinary preemption is more 
common than complete preemption and can be present even when a 
conflict with state law is not present.60 For example, ordinary preemption 
exists not just when a conflict with state law arises, but also when 
Congress strongly intended to occupy an entire legal field or regulatory 
scheme; one can then infer from this intent that Congress did not wish state 
law to supplant the relevant scheme.61 Moreover, ordinary preemption can 
occur when the statute expressly states an intent to displace state law.62 
C. The Preemptive Power of the ICCTA 
Federal preemption provides a powerful bar to plaintiffs asserting 
state law claims.63 In the context of the ICCTA, preemption means that 
plaintiffs may not have the ability to seek redress under state law for 
injuries caused by railroad activities.64 Arguments have been made that 
support and oppose ICCTA preemption, but courts are still in 
disagreement as to whether the ICCTA preempts state law.65 
1. Framing the ICCTA Preemption Arguments 
Most commonly, ICCTA preemption is brought as a defense on the 
merits, making ordinary preemption the relevant doctrine.66 Defendants 
often claim that the state or local law at issue deals with matters expressly 
and exclusively reserved for the STB by the ICCTA.67 Other times, 
defendants will raise ordinary preemption as a defense because the law, 
 
 57. Id.  
 58. See Fayard, 533 F.3d at 45. Preemption in this context is often referred to as 
conflict preemption. Id.  
 59. See id.  
 60. See id. at 44; see also AUSNESS, supra note 44, at 919. 
 61. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988). 
Preemption in this context is often referred to as implied preemption. Id.  
 62. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 243 (1947). 
 63. See Ausness, supra note 44, at 919. 
 64. See, e.g., Maynard v. CSX Transp., 360 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842–43 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 65. Compare id.(holding that plaintiffs’ tort claims preempted by the ICCTA), with 
Guild v. Kan. City S. Ry., 541 F. App’x 362, 365 (5th Cir. 2013)(finding that plaintiffs’ 
state tort claims were not preempted by the ICCTA).   
 66. See, e.g., Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry., 503 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 67. See New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 332 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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regulation, or cause of action “could be used to deny [the] railroad the 
ability to conduct some part of its operations or to proceed with activities 
that the Board has authorized.”68 Even if the preemption defense does not 
fit perfectly into one of these situations, the defense can still be appropriate 
if the cause of action “would have the effect of preventing or unreasonably 
interfering with railroad transportation.”69 Therefore, federal circuit courts 
tend to apply an “unreasonable-burden-or-interference-test” in 
determining whether preemption is appropriate.70 
Complete preemption under the ICCTA is less common, and 
defendants often fail to persuade courts to find that the ICCTA completely 
preempts the state law claim.71 Courts reject complete preemption under 
the ICCTA because no substitute or superseding federal cause of action or 
remedy is available for the injured party.72 Interestingly, though, plaintiffs 
whose claims fail because of a successful ordinary preemption defense are 
often left without a subsequent remedy anyway.73 Regardless of whether 
complete preemption or ordinary preemption is adopted then, courts risk 
allowing the injured plaintiffs to enter a legal limbo where they cannot be 
made whole. 
2. The Reach of ICCTA Preemption 
Courts have analyzed the ICCTA’s preemptive power in the context 
of local ordinances, permit requirements, state and local environmental 
laws, and local laws regulating the construction, maintenance, and 
removal of bridges and culverts.74 Additionally, courts have analyzed the 
 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 332 (“For state or local actions that are not facially preempted, the section 
10501(b) preemption analysis requires a factual assessment of whether that action would 
have the effect of preventing or unreasonably interfering with railroad transportation.”). 
State actions that foreclose or restrict a railroad from conducting any of its operations are 
said to unreasonably interfere with interstate commerce. Id.  
 70. See Tubbs v. Surface Transp. Bd., 812 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2015); see also 
Pace v. CSX Transp., 613 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2010); Island Park, LLC v. CSX 
Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2009); PCS Phosphate Co. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 559 F.3d 
212, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2009); Adrian & Blissfield R. Co. v. Vill. of Blissfield, 550 F.3d 
533, 540 (6th Cir. 2008); New York Susquehanna & W. Ry. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 254 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 71. See, e.g., Allied Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ohio Cent. R.R., No. 4:09-CV-01904, 2010 
WL 987156, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2010); see also Fayard v. Ne. Vehicle Servs., 533 
F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 72. See Fayard, 533 F.3d at 49 (“[A]bsent a clear cut federal cause of action, a danger 
exists of creating gaps in protection by categorically supplanting state claims with non-
existent federal remedies.”). 
 73. See id. 
 74. See generally Norfolk S. Ry Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 
2010) (holding that permit requirements and laws are preempted); Green Mountain R.R. v. 
Vermont, 404 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that environmental laws are preempted); 
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ICCTA’s preemptive power in the context of tort claims related to noise, 
vibrations, smoke, odors, and other disagreeable aspects of increased 
railroad traffic or other activity.75 Whether or not an existing state or local 
law, regulation, or a particular cause of action is preempted by § 10501(b) 
often turns on how courts interpret the intent of Congress and the purpose 
of the ICCTA.76 
Both the language and the legislative history of the statute suggest 
that Congress meant to preempt only the laws and causes of action that 
directly impacted the management or governance of railroads.77 
Traditional state police powers were not to be affected, and those laws that 
had only incidental impacts on the economics and operations of railroads 
were not subject to preemption.78 
Though congressional intent seems to suggest reining in the ICCTA’s 
preemptive power, courts disagree on whether certain laws or causes of 
action directly impact railroads in a way that treads on STB jurisdiction.79 
These cases are fact dependent, and the way in which the relevant law 
impacts the railroad is key.80 A court may interpret the ICCTA preemption 
clause narrowly, allowing preemption only when the state law regulates in 
a way that interferes with STB regulation.81 In contrast, a court may adopt 
a broad interpretation of ICCTA preemption and choose to preempt laws 
that merely relate, rather than regulate, railroad activity.82 Even the courts 
applying preemption narrowly, though, have found that laws, ordinances, 
 
Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. CSX Transp., 484 S.E.2d 799 (1997) (holding that construction 
laws are preempted).   
 75. See generally Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry., 503 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that tort claims are not preempted). 
 76. See id. at 1129. 
 77. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017); see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. v. City 
of W. Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).   
 78. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 79. See, e.g., Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1129 (finding that plaintiffs’ tort claims that 
railroad’s failure to maintain tracks and drains resulted in flooding of their property were 
only incidentally impactful to the railroad and were not preempted). But see Tubbs v. 
Surface Transp. Bd., 812 F.3d 1141, 1146 (8th Cir. 2015) (finding that plaintiffs’ tort 
claims for failure to maintain flood prevention system impacted railroads and acted as a 
regulatory measure, thereby requiring preemption). 
 80. See Emerson, 503 F.3d at 1129–30. 
 81. See, e.g., Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry., 785 F.3d 1182, 1192 (8th 
Cir. 2015). In Griffioen, Plaintiffs brought negligence claims against a railroad after the 
railroad parked loaded railcars on a bridge in anticipation of a flood in hopes that the cars 
would keep the tracks from being impacted by the flood waters. Id. at 1185. Instead, the 
weight of the cars caused the bridge to collapse, leading to intensified flooding and other 
damage to plaintiffs’ property. Id. The court held the claims were not preempted because 
bringing this suit and allowing recovery for such egregious behavior did not significantly 
impede STB regulatory power or significantly impact railroad activity. Id. at 1192.  
 82. See Carter H. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption Against Preemption to 
Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste Transfer Stations, 34 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1147, 1167 (2007). 
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or causes of action that economically impact railroads are preempted by 
the ICCTA.83 
Irrespective of how courts interpret the ICCTA preemption clause, 
the determinative issue is whether the state law or cause of action regulates 
the rail industry.84 The laws that do are preempted.85 Courts grapple with 
deciding whether a law has this regulatory effect, or alternatively, whether 
the law has only an incidental impact on railroads that does not rise to the 
level of regulation.86 
The predominant way in which a law or cause of action regulates 
railroads is by increased economic burden. If, for example, a state law 
requires a railroad to change its facilities or alter its operation to comply 
with a state environmental statute, then that state law appears to 
economically impact the railroad and is thus preempted.87 Economic 
impact is less obvious when, for example, a cause of action is brought 
against a railroad because the railroad’s activity tortiously impacted 
another party.88 
D. Tort Preemption and the ICCTA 
When a state tort cause of action is brought against a railroad, the 
court must decide whether the cause of action is interfering with railroad 
activities in such a way that the ICCTA requires preemption of the tort 
claim.89 Courts must consider this question because potential damages that 
can result from a tort claim may act as a form of regulation on railroads.90 
The damages or relief, if severe enough or if cumulated, could 
economically impact railroads, which is forbidden by the ICCTA.91 
Moreover, tort suits that relate to the operation, design, construction, or 
maintenance of a railroad may seek injunctive relief to force the railroads 
to change.92 This type of injunctive relief can have an economic impact on 
 
 83. Id.  
 84. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (stating unambiguously that 
ICCTA remedies “with respect to regulation of rail transportation” are exclusive and have 
preemptive power) (emphasis added). 
 85. Id.  
 86. See, e.g., Guild v. Kan. City S. Ry., 541 F. App’x 362, 368 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that plaintiff’s negligence claims were not so burdensome as to “regulate” the railroad 
defendant’s activity).  
 87. Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 88. See, e.g., Guild, 541 F. App’x at 367. 
 89. Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 593 F.3d 404, 410 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 90. Pace v. CSX Transp., 613 F.3d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 91. Id.  
 92. See, e.g., Maynard v. CSX Transp., 360 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842–43 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
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railroads and act as a private form of regulation and governance that is 
reserved by the ICCTA for the STB.93 
If, however, courts determine that the impact of bringing a tort claim 
is only incidental and does not act as a de facto form of regulation, then 
the claim will not be preempted.94 Tort claims serve a critical function in 
keeping railroads accountable.95 Often, these claims are the sole means for 
an injured party to receive compensation and restitution.96 As such, 
sometimes courts will require the railroads to demonstrate not just that the 
tort claim interferes with the railroad, but that it unreasonably interferes.97 
When courts apply this heightened standard, preemption is less likely.98 
1. Case Law Disfavoring Tort Preemption 
Courts rule against preempting state law tort claims when the cause 
of action has only an incidental impact on railroads and does not 
unreasonably interfere with railroad activity.99 For example, in Guild v. 
Kansas City Southern Railway,100 the plaintiffs claimed that the railroad 
was negligent when it allegedly damaged a non-mainline track on which 
the plaintiffs had allowed the railroad to store cars.101 The court held that 
the plaintiffs’ negligence claims were not preempted, primarily because 
the railroad failed to explain how the plaintiffs’ claims would interfere 
with rail transportation.102 
In addition, in Emerson v. Kansas City Southern Railway,103 plaintiff 
land-owners claimed that the railroad had discarded railroad ties and 
debris into a drainage ditch, which caused flooding on their neighboring 
property.104 The court reasoned that the railroad’s actions were not part of 
rail transportation and that the claim would have only an incidental impact 
on the railroad’s activities and economics.105 The court thus concluded that 
the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted.106 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Guild v. Kan. City S. Ry., 541 F. App’x 362, 367, 368 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 95. See Geistfeld, supra note 15, at 142.  
 96. See, e.g., Maynard, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 843. 
 97. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252–54 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 98. See, e.g., New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry., 533 F.3d at 332. 
 99. See, e.g., Guild, 541 F. App’x at 368. 
 100. Guild v. Kan. City S. Ry., 541 F. App’x 362 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 101. Id. at 364–65. 
 102. Id. at 367. 
 103. Emerson v. Kan. City S. Ry., 503 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 104. Id. at 1128.  
 105. Id. at 1131–32. 
 106. Id. at 1132. 
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2. Case Law Favoring Tort Preemption 
On the other hand, courts rule that state tort claims against railroads 
are preempted by the ICCTA when those claims directly interfere with 
railroad activities or when the damages that could result from the tort 
causes of action could have a regulatory impact on railroads.107 For 
example, in Pace v. CSX Transportation,108 plaintiffs claimed that a 
railroad’s new operation on a sidetrack increased rail traffic and caused 
noise, smoke, and vibrations that made the plaintiffs’ neighboring land 
virtually uninhabitable and unusable.109 The court ruled that the plaintiffs’ 
tort claims were preempted because the claims interfered with railroad 
activities and that Congress intended all claims that had this impact to be 
preempted.110 
Similarly, in Tubbs v. Surface Transportation Board,111 plaintiffs’ 
nearby properties were flooded due to a railroad’s failure to properly 
maintain and construct its culverts and drainage system on neighboring 
tracks.112 The plaintiffs argued that bringing this cause of action would 
have only an incidental impact on railroad activity and pointed out that no 
remedy existed under federal law for the plaintiffs to seek restitution and 
damages.113 Plaintiffs cited Emerson to support their assertion that 
bringing a negligence claim against the railroad based on the railroad’s 
flood-causing behavior should not be preempted.114 
Despite these arguments, the court found that the tort claims were 
preempted by the ICCTA.115 The court distinguished Emerson, stating that 
in Emerson, the claims were not preempted because requiring railroads to 
remove materials clogging the drainage system would not have a 
significant impact on railroad activities and economics.116 In Tubbs, 
however, the claims could have forced the railroad to adjust its drainage 
system construction and maintenance practices.117 The plaintiffs could 
have brought claims under an alternative safety statute to force 
construction alteration going forward, but could not gain restitution related 
to their flooded property because no tort-like substitute existed under 
federal law.118 
 
 107. See, e.g., Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2009) 
 108. Pace v. CSX Transp., Inc., 613 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 109. Id. at 1068. 
 110. Id. at 1069. 
 111. Tubbs v. Surface Transp. Bd., 812 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 112. Id. at 1143.  
 113. Id. at 1145. 
 114. Id. at 1146. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 1145.  
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E. Legal Limbo: The Consequence of ICCTA Tort Preemption 
Before analyzing the justifications for closing the legal limbo 
plaintiffs enter because of ICCTA tort preemption, an example of the 
injustice that results from courts applying ICCTA preemption too broadly 
should be highlighted. In Maynard v. CSX Transportation Inc.,119 
landowner plaintiffs brought several tort claims such as negligence and 
nuisance against a railroad.120 According to the plaintiffs, the railroad’s 
coal loading operation on a sidetrack near the plaintiffs’ property blocked 
the plaintiffs from entering or exiting their land via a normal route.121 
Moreover, the operation caused noise and dust pollution, thus interfering 
with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their land.122 The plaintiffs also 
alleged that by virtue of the side track, the railroad negligently permitted 
drainage from adjoining properties to escape onto their property, which 
further diminished the property value.123 The railroad’s activity damaged 
the land itself, prevented the owners from enjoying that land, and made 
selling the land for a fair price nearly impossible.124 
The court held that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were preempted by the 
ICCTA.125 The court reasoned that the coal loading activity on the nearby 
side track was operational in nature and that bringing these claims 
interfered with this railroad activity.126 Allowing plaintiffs to bring such 
causes of action would infringe upon regulation reserved for the STB.127 
Plaintiffs alternatively argued that no substitute federal remedy existed 
and that preemption was therefore not appropriate.128 The court 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs lacked recourse under federal law, but 
asserted that the ICCTA’s preemptive force prevailed nonetheless.129 
Whether Congress intended for the ICCTA to preempt state law that 
regulated railroads cannot be disputed.130 As evidenced by cases like 
Maynard, however, courts applying preemption broadly leave injured 
plaintiffs uncompensated and without means to seek redress.131 Plaintiffs 
like those in Maynard suffer harm directly because of a railroad’s tortious 
 
 119. Maynard v. CSX Transp., 360 F. Supp. 2d 836 (E.D. Ky. 2004). 
 120. Id. at 841. 
 121. Id. at 837–38. 
 122. Id. at 838.  
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 125. Id. at 843. 
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 127. Id.  
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 129. Maynard, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 843.  
 130. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2012 & Supp. 2017). 
 131. Maynard, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 843–44. 
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conduct.132 These plaintiffs suffer damage to their property by no fault of 
their own, and yet, they are unable to seek restitution.133 Railroads, in turn, 
are not held accountable and have nothing to deter them from behaving 
similarly in the future.134 
III. ANALYSIS 
Notions of equity and fairness demand that this legal limbo be closed 
and that state tort claims brought by plaintiffs should not be preempted by 
the ICCTA. To correct such injustices, like the outcome in Maynard,135 
the ICCTA should be amended. Alternatively, if legislative action is not 
taken, courts should adjust the way ICCTA tort preemption analysis is 
approached by placing more emphasis on equity and fairness. 
To reach this conclusion, several issues will be analyzed. First, the 
tort preemption problem that plaintiffs have encountered under a similar 
piece of legislation, the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA),136 will be 
examined.137 The FRSA’s preemption provision also caused various 
plaintiffs who were harmed by railroads to fall into a legal limbo when 
trying to bring tort claims.138 Recognizing this injustice, Congress 
amended the FRSA so that tort claims were no longer expressly 
preempted.139 Congress should similarly amend the ICCTA. 
Next, the way in which courts have addressed, or more often, ignored, 
this legal limbo will be explored.140  Courts often brush aside the fact that 
no substitute remedy exists, instead choosing to focus on congressional 
intent.141 Finally, the Supreme Court’s view on tort preemption will be 
analyzed.142 Though the Supreme Court has established the legitimacy of 
tort preemption,143 the Court has also acknowledged that equity and 
fairness should not be ignored.144 
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 138. See infra Section III.A. 
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 140. See infra Section III.B. 
 141. See infra Section III.B. 
 142. See infra Section III.C. 
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 550 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW Vol. 123:2 
A. Solving the Tort Preemption Problem under the FRSA 
Just as Congress can set forth laws that preempt state tort claims, it 
can also correct these laws when they result in unforeseen injustice.145 
When Congress aims to federally regulate a field or industry, preemption 
is often necessary.146 Preempting ensures that state and local laws do not 
conflict or otherwise interfere with federal regulation.147 Exclusive federal 
control often leads to a more efficient and cohesive system of regulation.148 
However, when preemption leads to inequitable and unjust consequences, 
Congress should clarify the law and rein in the law’s preemptive force. 
Such action by Congress is not without precedent, even in the railroad 
context.149 The FRSA’s preemption clause forced plaintiffs into a legal 
limbo, just as the ICCTA has.150 Congress, in 2007, amended the FRSA to 
address this problem.151 
Whereas the ICCTA gives the STB exclusive regulatory control over 
railroad economic matters, the FRSA gives the Federal Rail 
Administration (FRA) control over railroad safety issues.152 The ICCTA 
and FRSA thus work in unison to govern the railroad industry.153 Like the 
ICCTA,154 the FRSA contains a preemption provision that makes 
exclusive the regulations set forth by the FRA.155 Any state or local law 
that interferes with or affects railroad safety is preempted by the FRSA.156 
When railroads violated federal safety standards and caused injuries 
to individuals, those individuals often brought state tort claims against the 
railroad.157 However, these claims were often preempted by FRSA.158 For 
example, if a plaintiff sued a railroad for negligence because a train was 
travelling too fast, that claim would be preempted because the FRA 
regulates train speed limits.159 Plaintiffs could sometimes pursue 
subsequent recourse by bringing a federal claim alleging a safety standard 
violation;160 however, the remedies the FRA provided only covered 
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specific safety violations.161 Most tortious behavior did not have an 
assigned remedy, and damages for personal injury based on tort were not 
available.162 The plaintiffs were thus forced into a legal limbo.163 
Just prior to the congressional amendment to the FRSA,164 the court 
in Mehl v. Canadian Pacific Railway165 tackled this injustice, stating: 
While the Federal Railroad Safety Act does provide for civil penalties 
to be imposed on non-compliant railroads, the legislation fails to 
provide any method to make injured parties whole and, in fact, closes 
every available door and remedy for injured parties. As a result, the 
judicial system is left with a law that is inherently unfair to innocent 
bystanders and property owners who may be injured by the negligent 
actions of railroad companies . . . . Such an unfair and inequitable 
result should be addressed through legislative action.166 
In Mehl, class action plaintiffs brought several tort claims against the 
railroad, alleging that the railroad improperly welded and maintained 
tracks, which caused a train to derail.167 The derailment caused personal 
injuries to the plaintiffs and damages to the plaintiffs’ properties.168 
Moreover, the train was carrying chemicals that were released into the air 
when the train derailed.169 The harm was severe, yet the court was forced 
to hold that the state tort claims were preempted.170 The court ruled 
reluctantly, recognizing the “unduly harsh” outcome.171 
Congress, facing public pressure, took note and amended the FRSA 
in 2007.172 The Amendment reads: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt an action under 
State law seeking damages for personal injury, death, or property 
damage alleging that a party— 
(A) has failed to comply with the Federal standard of care established 
by a regulation or order issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with 
respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland 
 
 161. See, e.g., Mehl, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. 
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Security (with respect to railroad security matters), covering the 
subject matter as provided in subsection (a) of this section; 
(B) has failed to comply with its own plan, rule, or standard that it 
created pursuant to a regulation or order issued by either of the 
Secretaries; or 
(C) has failed to comply with a State law, regulation, or order that is 
not incompatible with subsection (a)(2). 
(2) This subsection shall apply to all pending State law causes of action 
arising from events or activities occurring on or after January 18, 
2002.173 
Although plaintiffs’ tort claims now must be based on a violation of a 
FRSA standard of care, the claims can nonetheless be brought.174 Plaintiffs 
now can seek damages and restitution when a railroad violates a safety 
standard.175 
Congress should similarly amend the ICCTA and declare that state 
tort causes of action are not preempted. Even if the damages that result 
from tort claims economically impact railroads, the purpose of bringing 
such claims is not to regulate, but rather, to make the plaintiffs whole.176 
As such, a blanket ban on ICCTA tort preemption is appropriate. If the 
claims impact railroads in a regulatory way, they do so only because of the 
railroads’ own tortious behavior.177 
Alternatively, the amendment could clarify that only those tort claims 
that seek to directly alter railroad operations or behavior are banned. 
Claims that simply seek damages for tortious behavior should never be 
preempted by the ICCTA. The paying of such damages should be viewed 
as a cost of doing business. If such damages serve to incidentally 
incentivize railroads to change their behavior to avoid causing harm in the 
future, then the public good will be served. 
B. Judicial Treatment of the ICCTA Tort Preemption Problem 
If legislative action is not taken, courts should adjust the way they 
decide ICCTA preemption cases. When deciding whether tort claims are 
preempted by the ICCTA, courts do sometimes acknowledge and address 
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the legal limbo plaintiffs could enter if preemption is found.178 However, 
the predominant consideration in deciding whether preemption is 
warranted is the intent of Congress in passing the ICCTA.179 In other 
words, when deciding if a tort claim acts as a form of regulation and thus 
triggers preemption, courts will ask if Congress intended the ICCTA’s 
preemptive power to extend to the law or suit in question.180 Given the 
disagreement and uncertainty about what laws Congress intended to 
preempt because of their regulatory effect, a focus on equity and fairness 
can guide courts to reach appropriate decisions.181 
1. A Focus on Congressional Intent 
In deciding if the ICCTA preempts a tort claim, courts will often turn 
to an analysis of congressional intent.182 Given the express language of § 
10501(b)183 and the history that prompted ICCTA development, Congress 
seemed to want to ensure that a patchwork of laws did not interfere with 
STB regulation.184 Courts disagree about whether Congress meant this 
preemptive force to apply broadly, or if instead, Congress only meant to 
preempt laws that directly and clearly impacted railroad operations.185 
Courts sometimes rule that state tort claims should not be preempted 
because a “presumption against preemption” exists when intent is 
unclear.186 These courts also point to the ICCTA’s legislative history, 
which suggests that Congress only meant to preempt laws that 
economically impacted railroads directly.187 Tort law is not aimed at 
railroads directly; all individuals and companies are subject to tort 
claims.188 Torts exist as a means for plaintiffs to seek restitution for harm 
done to them, not for the purpose of regulating railroads.189 Torts thus have 
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only an incidental impact on railroads, and are therefore not the kind of 
laws that Congress meant to preempt.190 
As reasonable and convincing as the narrow interpretation of 
congressional intent is, most courts still apply the ICCTA preemption 
provision broadly.191 These courts believe Congress developed § 10501(b) 
to ensure the STB had exclusive control over the railroad industry.192 
Congress’ goal of uniformity can only be achieved if laws that have a 
regulatory effect are preempted. Torts, these courts argue, have the same 
regulatory impact as allowing states to directly impose restrictions on 
railroads.193 The absence of a savings clause or prescribed substitute 
federal remedy is only further evidence of Congress’ desire to protect 
railroads and ensure interstate commerce is not affected.194 
The merits of these competing interpretations of § 10501(b) are 
outside the scope of this analysis. More relevant is the large body of 
conflicting case law which suggests that courts will not reach a consensus 
in the future. Courts must shift their focus away from statutory 
interpretation and intent, and towards notions of equity and fairness. 
2. A Focus on Equity and Fairness 
Justice Ginsburg of the United States Supreme Court argued in her 
dissent in Norfolk Southern Railway v. Shanklin195 that the displacement 
of state tort law “with no substantive federal standard of conduct to fill the 
void” creates an outcome that “defies common sense and sound policy.”196 
Courts cannot turn a blind eye at the legal limbo that plaintiffs enter when 
ICCTA tort preemption is applied. In fact, some courts have chosen to 
prioritize fairness over uncertain statutory interpretation when deciding if 
tort preemption is warranted.197 Such an approach should be uniformly 
adopted by courts. 
For example, in Emerson, the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument 
that torts truly have a regulatory impact on railroads and explained that 
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such an argument “has no obvious limit, and if adopted would lead to 
absurd results.”198 Moreover, in Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Services,199 
the First Circuit found that a plaintiff’s tort claims should not be 
preempted, in part because no substitute federal remedy was available.200 
The court stated that “the critical question is whether federal law provides 
an exclusive substitute federal cause of action that a federal court (or 
possibly a federal agency) can employ for the kind of claim or wrong at 
issue.”201 
Furthermore, courts must also not ignore the critical legal function of 
torts in ensuring that victims of harmful behavior are left with recourse.202 
Given that the ICCTA provides no adequate remedy for victims of railroad 
misconduct, torts are the sole mechanism for compensation.203 Whereas 
regulations are designed to have a prophylactic effect and encourage 
specific behavior, torts are brought after harm has already been inflicted. 
Torts serve to compensate, not regulate.204 Applying tort preemption 
liberally thus risks functionally “sweeping away” tort law.205 
C. The Supreme Court’s View on Tort Preemption 
The Supreme Court’s view on tort preemption also suggests that 
fairness and equity should be considered when deciding if preemption is 
appropriate. Numerous times, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the 
legitimacy of tort preemption.206 No doubt exists that such preemption is 
legal, and in fact, common.207 Nonetheless, the Court has also recognized 
that when a statute is ambiguous and when no substitute remedy exists, a 
presumption against preemption should be applied.208 
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1. Supreme Court Case Law Development: A Bumpy Track 
In the 1980’s, the Supreme Court refused to apply various preemption 
provisions broadly because no substitute remedy was available for the 
injured plaintiffs.209 Then, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,210 a plurality of 
the Court decided that plaintiffs’ tort claims against cigarette 
manufacturers were preempted by a federal statute that regulated safety in 
the cigarette industry.211 Despite the Court’s limited holding,212 and 
despite the Court’s hesitation in leaving plaintiffs without a remedy,213 
lower courts took the decision as a signal that tort claims can be preempted 
if the statute expresses a desire to preempt state law.214 
In a subsequent case, Medtronic v. Lohr,215 however, the Court ruled 
that a statute which regulated the medical device industry did not preempt 
plaintiffs from bringing tort claims against pacemaker manufacturers 
based on defective products.216 The Court explained that allowing this 
statute to have such preemptive force would “have the perverse effect of 
granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire 
industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent 
regulation . . . .”217 Thus, the Court in Lohr considered equity and fairness 
in their analysis and once again leaned on the presumption against 
preemption.218 
Lohr distinguished, rather than overruled Cipollone.219  The Court in 
Lohr believed the language of the relevant statute in Cipollone gave the 
plaintiff in that case the ability to pursue some common law causes of 
actions if such claims were framed differently.220 As such, preemption was 
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not as inequitable.221 In Lohr, however, no such subsequent or alternative 
remedy was available.222 Unlike Cipollone, preempting in Lohr would 
“require far greater interference with state legal remedies, producing a 
serious intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out 
the possibility of remedy for the Lohr’s alleged injuries.”223 Lohr thus 
supports the proposition that equity and fairness be considered when 
deciding if preemption is proper.224 
Just like the plaintiffs in Lohr, plaintiffs forced into legal limbo by 
the ICCTA are left without a substitute remedy.225 Courts are conflicted 
about the congressional intent of § 10501(b).226 Some courts view torts as 
having a regulatory impact on railroads, while other courts see tort impact 
as merely incidental.227 Notions of equity and fairness are thus an ideal 
tiebreaker. Justice demands that courts allow these injured individuals to 
bring tort claims and hold railroads accountable for their tortious behavior. 
D. Recommendation 
Congress is in the best position to correct the injustice that results 
from ICCTA tort preemption. By amending the ICCTA, Congress can rein 
in the Act’s preemptive power. A blanket ban on ICCTA tort preemption 
is ideal, as innocent victims are owed their day in court. Any concerns over 
railroad regulation should take a back seat to justice. Alternatively, the 
amendment could clarify that only those tort claims that seek to directly 
alter railroad operations or behavior be banned. Claims that simply seek 
damages for tortious behavior should never be preempted by the ICCTA. 
If Congress fails to fill this legal gap, or until Congress acts, courts 
should correct this injustice. Courts must place more emphasis on equity 
and fairness when deciding if tort claims are preempted by the ICCTA. If 
an innocent plaintiff is destined to enter a legal limbo because of 
preemption, then preemption is not appropriate. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The ICCTA’s preemption clause gives the STB exclusive jurisdiction 
over surface transportation matters.228 In doing so, however, the ICCTA is 
forcing plaintiffs to enter a legal limbo where their state tort claims are 
preempted by the ICCTA, but where no substitute federal causes of action 
exist.229 Railroads can thus run roughshod, never being held accountable 
for their tortious behavior.230 Most importantly, innocent plaintiffs cannot 
seek recourse for the harm done to them.231 Such an outcome offends basic 
notions of equity and fairness. 
Congress has amended the FRSA to ensure plaintiffs can bring tort 
claims when a railroad violates a safety law.232 The ICCTA needs similar 
amending. Courts disagree about the congressional intent of 49 U.S.C. § 
10501(b).233 This lack of consensus suggests that a new focus should guide 
courts in determining if tort preemption is appropriate. By focusing on 
equity and fairness, just as Supreme Court precedent suggests,234 courts 
will ensure a just outcome is reached. Plaintiffs should never be left 
without a remedy when a railroad behaves tortiously. 
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